Interview with Jim Doyle, January 30, 1985

Partial Transcript: Recurring argument that the economic groups from which the party sought support should have “some institutional status within the party framework” and a regularity of consultation. Never took hold, but the party did constantly reach out to labor and farm groups.

Partial Transcript: Labor more important than farm groups in terms of money, personnel for campaigns, and numbers. Wisconsin State Federation of Labor (WSFL) leadership cool toward identifying itself too closely with the Democratic Party in Wisconsin. George Haberman, president of the WSFL, “I think was really a Republican, and certainly not a Democrat, and certainly not an enthusiast for the efforts that were being made to change the direction and increase the power of the Democrats in Wisconsin.” There were working relationships with leaders of various WSFL-affiliated groups--Jake Friedrick, for example. “The real active association between the Democratic Party and the labor movement was on the CIO side, and specifically and particularly the UAW (United Auto Workers) but also to some extent the Steelworkers.” Some Machinist leadership (WSFL) was helpful. “There was just no such thing as a Democratic-Farmer-Labor coalition that was in place....” “Labor people just did not decide during those years that their interests lay in a close, active commitment and working relationship with the Democrats as contrasted with the Republicans. They kept their distance and they bargained politically with the people who were in power, whoever they were, Republicans or Democrats.” In Kenosha and Racine, however, it seemed that at least half of the DOC activists were labor people. Harvey Kitzman, UAW regional director, “was an all-out Democrat and a very, very able, good person.”

Partial Transcript: Bob Lewis “was the key to it. He was the key to educating somebody like me about the farm organizations and who was who.” Carl Thompson, Miles McMillin, and Gaylord Nelson had wide acquaintances with “the farm people and the co-op people.” Floyd Wheeler was an important link with the REA. Many farm co-op leaders had Progressive backgrounds, thus providing a natural link to Carl Thompson.

Partial Transcript: Philleo Nash (party chair 1955-1957) “did have that kind of a vision.” Nash was close to labor people; had worked at it. Nothing came of it.

Partial Transcript: “Definitely changed it in terms of the status of the Democratic Party in Wisconsin in the eyes of labor groups, farm groups, and co-op groups and so forth. We were no longer viewed as some people who were struggling to go somewhere in a general direction that coincided with labor's goals or the farm co-ops' goals. We, that is the Democratic Party in Wisconsin, was a power.” Gaylord Nelson, elected governor in 1958, had had close ties to labor, having been a law partner with well-known labor lawyer John Lawton.

Partial Transcript: Some concern in 1949 at the first convention whether the word “Organizing” implied that this organization was transitory, that it was a prelude to something else. However, since organizing was the number one priority, it was decided to leave the name as it was originally conceived at the May 1948 Fond du Lac meeting and change it to a more permanent sounding name sometime later. No one entertained the notion that the “OC” of DOC would have some appeal within the labor movement because of the “OC” used by the CIO when it was first getting going. Also, “we newcomers felt that we had to be very respectful of the statutory organization and not come charging in and taking a title like 'the Democratic Party of Wisconsin.'”

Partial Transcript: DOC had no recognition at all from the national party at the time of the 1952 Democratic National Convention. Credentials and everything went to the statutory organization. “We newcomers showed some admirable restraint.” Sometime in the mid-1950s the Democratic National Committee came to recognize the DOC as the Democratic Party in Wisconsin. “The transition occurred naturally then.”

Partial Transcript: Doyle cannot remember how it worked, but expects the statutory committee had the authority to make these selections in the late 1940s and early 1950s. “As early as November of 1949, there were no differences of opinion, no differences in view between the people who occupied the significant offices in the statutory party and the people who were in the DOC.”

Partial Transcript: Bob Tehan handled patronage “right up to the moment that he could no longer do so.” National Committeeman and Committeewoman “would have continued to administer that.” The new people had a consensus that patronage would not be used “as an instrument for developing party strength.” There were negative aspects of involving the DOC too heavily in the patronage business, which consisted mainly of rural mailcarrier positions, because selection of one person for the post would no doubt result in the bad feelings of all the other job aspirants. Doyle does not recall the DOC's patronage committee set up in late 1951. Suspects such a committee might have been formed to make sure patronage jobs were not “dissipated on non-Democrats.”

Partial Transcript: Milwaukee was different in that there had been a Democratic Party in existence there for years. There was in existence a network of people. “Among those people who had been active in that kind of a relatively loose organizational kind of a thing among the Democrats in Milwaukee, among those people I remember that I had the sense that they considered that it was sort of a big bore, all this cheerleading and pep rally stuff and all that that we were injecting into this to have this big mass organization.” Adding membership seemed unimportant to them. “The whole membership thing never really took hold, except in the silk-stocking districts where, lets say along the north shore and so on, where active units got organized.” In those areas, there was a feeling that they were part of a big, statewide push to develop the party.

Partial Transcript: There came a point where the DOC had been successful in building membership, bringing forth good leaders, “and all in all it was something very much to be admired, but what was it? It was kind of like a lodge, like the Eagles or the Elks or the Moose or something. It had its internal life...but connecting it to getting more votes than the Republicans in the elections...that connection was not very clear.” Even before electoral success, when candidates began to build their own organizations and people came to look to those organizations rather than the party, “it would be very difficult to say that the DOC...had any direct impact on anything.”

Partial Transcript: “The organization of a group of people in Wisconsin after the War within the Democratic Party to try to make it go; I think it was a short-term phenomenon and that's probably the way it was destined to be and there's nothing wrong with it.”

Partial Transcript: “Process, fairness in process, fairness in the way in which decisions are made and the participation in decisions and so on, is not only almost as important as the subsequent decisions that emerge from it, but probably does shape the decisions.”

Partial Transcript: It just seemed to be a logical way to generate interest in the party and to capture former Progressives.

Partial Transcript: The model of a membership organization down to the county level naturally led to a participatory organization. Amongst the Madison activists “it was pretty much a consensus thing all along.” There was a group of people who were in continual touch with one another and no one tried to take over. This served as a model that was reflected throughout the organization.

Partial Transcript: Surprising that four people would be interested in the office so soon in the DOC's life. “The biggest thing, I think, to explain that was Truman's victory. It's really difficult to exaggerate the impact of the 1948 victory of Truman's.” Also, Fairchild's election and Thompson's good showing in 1948. There was a feeling that one might actually win. Also, “Wiley was a kind of an inviting target. In our eyes at least he was kind of a bumbling guy and looked as though he might be vulnerable. We under-estimated him considerably both in terms of his political strength and in terms of his political savvy.”

Partial Transcript: A special case. “From about 1940 or so on, as I recall it, Dan was doing what we were later doing in trying to develop the Democratic Party.” Ambitious and had previously been very successful.

Partial Transcript: “An interesting manifestation of the developing activism on the farm side and on the co-op side.”

Partial Transcript: Ambitious. Incumbent attorney general, which “looked like a good springing off place. You know, it was a time when just about anybody could just up and run for governor. I did in 1954.”

Partial Transcript: Merlin Hull was the tolerant one in this setting, since Hull, a progressive Republican, allowed his secretary to run on the Democratic ticket. Hull “I am sure...was sympathetic to what we were doing. And he probably figured that we didn't represent a real threat to him.”

Partial Transcript: Was opposed by George Molinaro, who had labor support. “It wasn't a real big deal.” Doyle decided to run, only shortly before the convention, “for reasons that had to do with the McCarthy election, and the fact that I was not going to be a candidate in '52.” Molinaro probably decided to run only a week before the convention. “So I don't think it would do to read too much into that competition, the fact that that competition occurred, although it did represent some kind of an assertion by labor it wanted one of its own, it wanted a big voice in the party, bigger voice than it had.” “I never was a guy that the labor people went for in a big way. I was too much of an egghead or something.” Probably won by a two to one margin, which reflected the fact that Doyle probably knew everyone at the convention while Molinaro had a much narrower base.

Partial Transcript: Wanted to accomplish “more of the same. We had the sense that we were really getting somewhere.” Also wanted a voice in the 1952 McCarthy campaign.

Partial Transcript: His defeat in 1952 became an obsession with Wisconsin Democrats.

Partial Transcript: Doyle and many others were ambitious and wanted to be the candidate to defeat McCarthy. “In any kind of a developed political setting, such as Wisconsin today, that would have been just ludicrous that I would think that I might be the person who would run and be elected to the Senate. But in those days, anybody who wanted to, would just pop in and do it. But we were mindful that it should be done right, that we should have a strong candidate, that we should try to get some unity early and start developing some unknown person over a long period of time so that by the fall of 1952 there'd be some well-recognized person there opposing McCarthy.” In addition to Doyle, Gaylord Nelson, Henry Reuss, Tom Fairchild and others were interested in being that person. Doyle and Nelson were close friends and decided not to run against each other in the primary. They decided in the summer of 1951 on arbitration as a means of deciding which one was to be the candidate. Doyle picked Morris Rubin as his “champion,” Nelson picked Miles McMillin, and those two picked Bob Lewis as the third party. “And the answer was Gaylord.” Henry Reuss had been privately indicating he would probably be a candidate. Doyle and Nelson thought Reuss should subject himself to the same type of arbitration procedure that they had engaged in. Meanwhile, Fairchild, who some thought would be the most attractive candidate, was leaning toward not running. The Reuss-Nelson arbitration was set up to a point, then Reuss backed out of the arbitration and announced his candidacy. Nelson then dropped his interest, not wanting to run against Reuss in the primary. “It was strictly a unilateral thing. Reuss just decided to do it and he did it. The rest of us, including me and including Gaylord who had all thought we were being just princes about the whole thing, were ticked off about that and weren't at all sure that Henry was the best candidate.” Very resistant to the idea that the whole thing should be settled “just by Henry's assertion of his candidacy.” Reuss started campaigning, but people around the state were reluctant to announce support for him. No one wanted to commit themselves in case a stronger candidate should appear.

Partial Transcript: Doyle had connections in the East “with potential contributors to the anti-McCarthy campaign. That became pretty much my specialty during that whole period up to November.” Reuss, meanwhile, was going East to raise money, presenting himself as the candidate. People would then check back with Doyle, as party chair.

Partial Transcript: “It was a very delicate time” because it was possible that Reuss would be the candidate, yet Doyle did not want to shut out other potential candidates by telling contributors that Reuss was the only candidate.

Partial Transcript: Former Progressive; Merrill lawyer. “That introduced a whole new dimension to the problems about organizing to beat McCarthy.”

Partial Transcript: Decided about June that he would not run. This left little time for any other candidate to arise. Doyle and everyone else pretty much decided that “Henry should be it.” Doyle was on a trip East when someone called to say Fairchild would run. This made it awkward for Doyle who was trying to convince people in the East that the proper way to defeat McCarthy was in the Democratic party, not the Republican primary, and that the party had settled on Henry Reuss. Doyle returned to Wisconsin, landing in Milwaukee where Fairchild met his plane. “He was chagrined about the fact that he had thought and spoken one way and then changed his mind. But people had been after him and after him. They really had.” “It was a terrific scramble to get enough signatures for Tom to get him on the ballot,” his decision came so close to the filing deadline.

Partial Transcript: “A very, very stout contest.”

Partial Transcript: “A whole lot of us had thought for quite a while that if it was just a question 'would Tom or Henry be the stronger candidate,' it would be Tom because of his statewide stature.” Many people around the state had that view. Doyle does not know what or who finally caused Fairchild to run.

Partial Transcript: The Milwaukee Journal claimed that Doyle supported this as the best means of defeating McCarthy. Doyle does not recall this, but suspects he would never have endorsed Kohler because “I was one of those who thought that developing the Democratic Party in Wisconsin over a period of years, of which 1952 was just one, was an objective and a focus that should not be dissipated in an effort to beat McCarthy.”

Partial Transcript: On that point Doyle deviated somewhat from his thoughts about not sacrificing the party in an effort to defeat McCarthy. “We all thought the best way to beat McCarthy would be for Bob to run against McCarthy in the Republican primary. And if Bob would do that, we would just lay off. It would be an interruption in our effort to build the Democratic Party.” Doyle and others approached Bob La Follette to run as a Democrat against McCarthy, but they did not feel he actually would run as a Democrat. “He was friendly, but he was cool to the idea right from the word 'go.' As I recall, he told us very promptly--it would be within a couple of days or so--'absolutely not.'”

Partial Transcript: Two principle avenues--Americans for Democratic Action and Maurice Rosenblatt's National Committee for an Effective Congress. People Doyle knew in these organizations would connect him with wealthy liberals. “Of course one thing would lead to another and I'd be given leads by one person to another person. So I corresponded, I telephoned, I went around to see people.” There was a pretty good willingness to contribute significant amounts of money--$500 or $1000--and no resentment to speak off amongst eastern Democratic candidates from whom this anti-McCarthy campaign might be taking money. “But they were all hung up by two things: One, despair; nobody could beat McCarthy.... And the other one was that we were in such disarray, we in Wisconsin.” Despite all this, the fundraising went well, especially in comparison to the 1948 and 1950 Democratic campaigns in Wisconsin.

Partial Transcript: Ed Bayley, a political reporter for the Journal at the time and now Dean of the School of Journalism at the University of California-Berkeley, “knew us real well, and so we would talk with him a lot. And he was terrifically anti-McCarthy. But the Journal, at a certain point, decided that it was really going to go after McCarthy. And they did. I mean, you wouldn't believe it as you read the staid Journal in recent years. It was a Cap Times type of campaign against McCarthy, and I'm sure far more influential.” When people contacted Doyle with campaign ammunition to use against McCarthy, he would simply refer them to the Journal.

Partial Transcript: “I'm afraid it never really settled down very clearly. Tom Fairchild would have been just incapable of having one of these slashing personal anti-McCarthy campaigns, and he didn't. So, to the extent that he set the tone of his own campaign, it would have been one where he just let the anti-McCarthyism just develop in the national news context and so on, but locally just do his thing and try to build on the strength that we'd been developing on these party efforts. And that was my view also about how the campaign should go.” Would not have been useful to spend what little time and money was available to tell people McCarthy was bad on civil liberties. “It would be about like letting people know that Jessie Helms is an extreme rightwinger.”

Partial Transcript: Doyle's widely quoted reaction to McCarthy's victory. “I certainly was giving expression to the great bulk of the anti-McCarthy voters in Wisconsin, not just the people in the Democratic Party.... It was an accurate statement of the way I felt about it.”

Partial Transcript: Stevenson wanted to offer Doyle the chairmanship, but Doyle was off fishing with his family and could not be found. “And I guess Stevenson's enthusiasm for me was not so intense that he wanted to wait very long. I'm happy I never received that call; by the way.”